ditching the double standard

A lot of people default to a double standard when it comes to the Christian symbolism used by Anders Breivik, the accused Norwegian terrorist. They will go to great lengths to deny "Christianity" had anything to do with his murderous rampage. They are careful to preserve the sanctity of the label "Christian", yet they are unhesitant to link "Muslim" with "terrorist" as if the two are indeed a compound word.

For example, I just read a Washington Post article on the recent Norway tragedy, and found myself responding to one of the comments at the base of the article. The article is definitely worth reading and contemplating. So is my post...

@collenut - I understand Thistlethwaite's argument to be more complex than you suggest.

You said that by “ticking a Facebook box and citing language that he clearly doesn't understand [Breivik does not make himself] connected to anything Christian.”

To use your example: by ticking a Facebook box and citing Christian language (regardless of how coherent the citation) Breivik DOES indeed connect himself to at least two Christian things - 1) he's connected with some sense of Christian self-identification, and 2) he's connected to Christianity as an interpreter of Christian language.

The first connection seems easily dismissible, since his self-identification seems absurd in light of his violent acts... but it's the double standard and default assumptions surrounding the religious identity of terrorists that Thistlethwaite is arguing against - her Juergensmeyer quote sums this up - "If bin Laden is a Muslim terrorist, Breivik and McVeigh are surely Christian ones."

Perhaps Thistlthwaite is suggesting that if representatives of the political right wish to detract Breivik's Christian self-identity, then they must also be prepared to treat Islam with the same grace as they are treating Christianity. They must be willing to apply the same benefit of the doubt to Islam. They must resist the Islamaphobic impulse to automatically HONOR the self-identification of Muslim terrorists while automatically DISREGARDING the self-identification of Christian terrorists.

I think that Thistlethwaite’s main point, however, deals with Breivik’s second point of connection to Christianity – he is connected to Christianity as an interpreter of Christian language, of Christian narrative, history, and tradition. She is clear that Breivik’s violence does not implicate Christianity as a whole (just as Muslim terrorists do not implicate Islam as a whole). What I understand Thistlethwaite to be arguing is that – right, left, or center – other self-identified Christians need to respond to Breivik’s interpretations by considering the complex connections between the array of sources (religious and political) that fueled his (mis)interpretations.

As she wrote in “When Christianity Becomes Lethal”: “It is absolutely critical that Christians not turn away from the Christian theological elements in such religiously inspired terrorism. We must acknowledge these elements in Christianity and forthrightly reject these extremist interpretations of our religion.”